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McNamer: Substituted Service on Resident Motorists
NOTE AND COMMENT
State organization furnishes the speakers and meets their expenses. A variety of subjects is made available as well as a considerable number of speakers--sometimes 25 or more in some
States. After the main speaker concludes his part of the program a general discussion of the legal problem or subject is entered into by the lawyers attending. The value of these Legal
Institutes in the States where they have operated has been found
to be considerable.
The Citizenship Day committee of the Montana Bar Association has presented to the Supreme Court a petition requesting
that under the direction of the Supreme Court and the District
Courts of the State a day be set aside each year to mark the coming of age of the youth of the State. Exercises and instruction
for the purpose of impressing upon these new citizens the rights
and duties incident to citizenship are planned. The entire bar
of the State will be asked to participate in this activity.
Some definite action to curb the unauthorized practice of
the law is contemplated by the association. A committee on Bar
Integration is active. The committee on Uniform District Court
Rules recently prepared a set of uniform rules and submitted
them to the district judges for their consideration. Uniform
practice in the various district courts has been advocated by the
bar for several years and now the individual lawyers are urged
to make their views known to the district judges with respect to
uniform rules.
It .has been proposed to make the office of the Secretary of
the association a clearing bureau for corrective and remedial
legislation which lawyers of the State might suggest. By this
means defects and ambiguities in the substantive and procedural
statutory law may be remedied through the influence and as a
result of the efforts of the bar.
To carry on any kind of a constructive program takes money. Inasmuch as the Montana Bar Association is dependent
solely on the dues voluntarily paid by members the membership
campaign is always in progress. The present officers of the association hope to see a record breaking membership this year.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON RESIDENT MOTORISTS
The Montana Supreme Court has, apparently for the first
time in any State, passed upon the constitutionality of a statute
authorizing substituted service of process upon a resident motor.
ist. Such service was upheld in Thompson v. District Court.1 The
'State ex ret. Thompson v. District Court, et al., 108 Mont. 362, 91 P.
(2d) 422 (1939). The Court said at p. 367 of 108 Mont., "In arriving
at our decision we have not had the benefit of direct precedent on the
question involved. Neither briefs of counsel nor our own independent
search have revealed a case where the constitutionality of an act as
broad as ours has been passed upon."
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novelty of the ruling justifies an effort to determine the scope
of the statute and the decision.
The leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff established that, unless there is consent to another mode of service, due process of
law requires personal service within the State in all actions in
personam. Exceptions, real or apparent, were from time to time
engrafted upon this rule' and in Hess v. Pawloski' the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts statute which provided that use of the highways of the State by a non-resident
motorist "shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such
non-resident of the registrar or his successor in office to be his
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful
processes in any action or proceeding against him growing out
of any accident or collision in which said non-resident may be
involved while operating a vehicle on such a way * * * " The
Court relied chiefly upon two earlier cases, one upholding a
highway regulatory measure on grounds of public safety,' the
other upholding, on similar reasoning, a requirement that nonresident motorists file consent to service on a local agent as a
condition precedent to use of the highways.! Today all but two
or three of the States have statutes authorizing service on nonresident motorists' and, although some have been held invalid
as to procedural details,' no serious question exists as to their
295 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877). See also Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S.
398, 44 L. Ed. 520, 20 S. Ct. 410 (1900).
'Entrance of a foreign corporation into a State was made conditional
upon consent to substituted service. International Harvester Co. v
Commonwealth, 234 U. S. 579, 58 L. Ed. 1479, 34 S. Ct. 944 (1914).
But it is recognized that such consent is a fiction. Pennsylvania Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 61 L. Ed. 610, 37 S. Ct.
344 (1914). Service on an individual outside the State through an
agent who was in the State selling corporate securities was upheld In
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 79 L. Ed. 1097, 55 S. Ct. 553
(1935), but in Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 63 L. Ed. 250, 39 S.
Ct. 97 (1918), service on an agent of a foreign partnership doing business within the State was invalidated.
'274 U. S. 352, 71 L. Ed. 1091, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927). For a general history of such statutes, see annotations in 35 A. L. R. 951, 57 A. L. R.
1239, and 99 A. L. R. 130.
'Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385, 35 S. Ct. 140
(1914).
'Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. Ed. 222, 37 S. Ct. 30 (1916).
'Maurice S. Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 58 (1938).

"Today, out of the forty-

eight States and the District of Columbia, apparently only Missouri,
Nevada and Utah do not make some provision for such service."
'Wuchter v. Pizzuttl, 276 U. S. 13, 72 L. Ed. 446, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928),
held invalid a statute which made no provision for communication to
the proposed defendant, it being stated that substituted service is
valid only "if the statutory provisions in themselves indicate that there
is a reasonable probability that if the statutes are complied with the
defendant will receive actuaf notice." The Montana statute requires
service by registered mail as well as upon the Secretary of State.
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basic constitutionality. In Charette v. District Court' the Montana statute, Chap. 10, Laws of 1937, was upheld insofar as it
applies to non-residents.
But the novel portion of the Montana statute is See. 3,
which provides that the operation by any person of a motor vehicle on the highways of the State shall be deemed equivalent to
an appointment by him of the Secretary of State to be his attorney to accept service of process in any action against him resulting from a highway accident, provided that such substituted
service shall not be sufficient as against any person who may
with due diligence be found and personally served within the
State." In the Thompson case, which upheld this Section, defendant was a minor and a resident of Montana at the time of
the accident but had left the State and taken employment in
Arizona prior to institution of the action. Inasmuch, however,
as his parents continued to reside in Montana, no reason is apparent why his domicil did not follow theirs nor, consequently,
why the decision should not have been limited to the case of
one who remains a resident.' But, although the Court took
cognizance of defendant's minority, the decision rather clearly
appears to have proceeded on the assumption that he was a nonresident. Mr. Justice Stewart, referring to the application of
the Act, spoke of one who "prior to the institution of an action
against him, removes from the State to live somewhere else," and
again, of "residents who leave the State, prior to institution of
suit against them, to live elsewhere." But whether this supposed non-residence was intended as a ground of the decision is
another matter. Was the Act upheld, then, insofar only as it
applies to those who are non-residents at the time of service or
is the rationale of the case broad enough to cover those who remain residents but, due to temporary absence or unknown address, cannot with due diligence be found and personally served
within the State?
The Court upheld the service in the Thompson case upon
exactly the same grounds as it upheld the service in the Charette
case, stating that "the reason for upholding the Act with respect
to non-residents temporarily in the State exists with like force
and effect in the case of a resident tort-feasor, who prior to suit
leaves the State permanently or for an indefinite time." The
latter clause suggests recognition of the issue as to defendant's
domicil and intention to uphold the Act irrespective thereof.
But the cases relied upon in the Charette case, like others sustaining non-resident motorist statutes, rest upon grounds pe9107 Mont. 489, 86 P. (2d) 750 (1939).
Similar provisions exist in Arizona, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Ohio. Culp, 37 Mica. L. REv. 58, at 68; 108
Mont. at 367.
n"During minority the domicile of an Infant continues to be the same
as that of the person from whom he took his domicile of origin, and
changes only with the domicile of that person." 19 C. J. 411.
1
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culiarly applicable to the non-resident. Those cases, recognizing that under Pennoyer v. Neff either personal service or consent to a different service must be shown, have purported to
find, in the State's supposed power to exclude the non-resident,'
authority for requiring that he consent to substituted service. It
has been easy, then, to consider use of the highways as manifesting consent. But it seems unlikely that the State would be found
to have power to exclude a resident taxpayer from the use of
the highways unless he consent to a form of service which would
otherwise be in violation of due process. And, although probably it is true that such consent is fictitious and that the real
basis for the legislation and the decisions is found in the general
authority of the State, under its police power, to regulate motor
traffic, there is less reason for extending this sort of regulation
to residents. There is doubtless much force to the argument,
accepted as an additional ground for requiring consent to substituted service, that amenability to suit at the situs of the accident will lead to caution by the non-resident who is speeding
through the State," but the argument is much weaker as applied
to a resident who is subject to such suit anyway. True, he might
later leave the State, but the expense and sacrifice involved
would surely discourage him from doing so. in most cases, and, in
any event, this possibility of escape would hardly operate upon
his mind to make him less cautious prior to an accident. It is
not believed that there is the practical need for resident motorist statutes or that they would be nearly so widely used as is true
of non-resident statutes."
It follows that the extension of this doctrine to resident motorists, as in the Thompson ease, cannot realistically depend
either upon the theory of consent or upon the theory of pub'he most natural construction of the leading cases cited in notes 4, 5
and 6 Is that the "power to exclude" is the result of, rather than the
reason for, the power to regulate. But under either view, it does not
follow, as the Montana Court apparently assumed it did, that a resident can be forced to consent to substituted service merely because a
non-resident can be.
""We know that ability to enforce criminal and civil penalties for
transgression is an aid in securing observance of laws. And In view of
the speed of the automobile and habits of men, we cannot say that
the legislature of New Jersey was unreasonable in believing that ability to establish, by legal proceedings within the State, any financial
liability of non-resident owners, was essential to public safety." Kane
v. New Jersey, supra, note 6, 242 U. S. at p. 167.
""In the following States the number of services which have been made
under their respective statutes since they were adopted are: California, 456; Florida, 480; Nebraska, 606; Ohio, 2,894; Oregon, 398. This
represents a substantial number annually because all of these statutes
are of fairly recent date. Since 1933, 250 summons have been served
in Michigan; In Texas, 266. 7,803 summons have been served from
August 1, 1935, to January 30, 1938, under Section 52, 52a, of the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law." Culp, 37 MICH. L. REV. 58
(1938).
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lie safety. This can be said of all motorists who are resident
at the time of the accident, regardless of whether they later become non-residents, leave the State temporarily, or stay in the
State. But another theory or ground of decision, not much
stressed in the cases involving non-residents, but possibly very
important, is that the State may under its police power protect
injured plaintiffs by making all motorists amenable to suit at the
situs of the accident. And this basis does apply in like manner
to a resident who becomes a non-resident as it does to one who
at all times is a non-resident. It would even support, although
to a lesser extent, extension of the statute to a resident who is
temporarily absent or merely cannot be found.
But, putting aside considerations of consent and police power,
there is a quite independent ground for upholding substituted
service upon a resident defendant in any action in personam
even though he be outside of the State. That is by virtue of the
extraterritorial authority of a State over her domiciliaries. Statutes authorizing the taking of personal jurisdiction by giving
notice to a resident outside of the State have been upheld.'
Though the United States Supreme Court has not as yet passed
upon them, the opinion has been expressed' that, by analogy to
the cases holding that Congress has jurisdiction over citizens
abroad," that Court will uphold them provided they require actual notice. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, with
the relaxation of the strict rule of Pennoyer v. Neff and the resulting emphasis upon reasonableness and probability of defendant receiving actual notice as the criterion of due process," decisions such as that of the Thompson case are really within the
spirit of the concept. The danger, originally much feared, that
fraud and oppression would be practiced upon defendants who
were unaware that suit had been begun against them, is reduced
to a minimum.
It appears, therefore, that the Montana Supreme Court, by
assuming that defendant had become a non-resident, upheld the
statute in its most doubtful application. There was no disposition to limit the decision to the case of a resident temporarily
absent. The conclusion must be that the Court meant to hold
the statute constitutional for all purposes.
The observation has been made" that, while these statutes
have been of much public benefit, legislation is now needed to
insure good faith plaintiffs and to protect defendants who are
"Becker v. Becker, 218 S. W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920) ; In re Hendrickson, 40 S. D. 211, 167 N. W. 172 (1918).

"Arthur A. Morrow, Jurisdiction in Personam Acquired by Extraterritorial Service of Notice, 20 IowA L. REv. 9 (1934).
"Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 76 L. Ed. 375, 52 S. Ct.
252 (1918).
"McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. Ed. 608, 37 S. Ct. 343 (1917).
"Culp, 37 MicH L. REv. 58 (1938), at p. 76.
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faced with the problem of letting a judgment go by default or
traveling some distance to litigate a groundless claim."
Burke McNamer.

CONFLICT OF LAWS GOVERNING ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE
H and W, domiciled in Montana, are married in Idaho and
return at once to Montana. By the law of one State or the other, the marriage is invalid.1 Two questions arise: (1) The Courts
of which State should take jurisdiction to annul this marriage?
(2) What law should those Courts apply to determine whether
an annulment should be granted?
The cases are by no means in agreement as to the answer to
the first of these questions. This uncertainty is amply illustrated by reference to the decisions of one jurisdiction, New Jersey.
In Blumenthal v. Tannenholz,2 the Court refused to take jurisdiction to annul a marriage contracted within the State; in
Avakian v. Aviakian,' the Court granted an annulment although
neither party was domiciled within the State and the marriage
did not take place there; and in Capasso v. Colonna,' the Court
refused to annul a marriage contracted in New York when the
parties were domiciled in New Jersey at all times.
Some Courts, distinguishing between void and voidable
marriages, have held that, whereas a void marriage may be annulled in either the State of domicil at time of suit or the State
where it was celebrated, a marriage which is voidable merely
can be annulled only in the State where it was celebrated'. The
majority of Courts today, however, in the interest of certainty
and uniformity, are inclined to give exclusive jurisdiction to
the Courts of the State wherein the parties are domiciled at the
"While the Montana statute, drafted carefully in the Ught of earlier
test cases, answers most questions, some are left unanswered. E. g.,
may a non-resident plaintiff take advantage of the act? That he may,
see Beach v. Perdue Co., 35 Del. 285, 163 Atl. 265 (1932). It was held
in State ex re. Ledin v. Davidson, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N. W. 718 (1934),
that plaintiff may not sue the executor or administrator of the deceased non-resident.
, 99 P. (2d) (1940), involved similar
Mont.'Cross v. Cross, facts. It was decided, however, after this note was written.
'31 N. J. Eq. 194 (1879).
'69 N. J. Eq. 89, 60 AtL. 521 (1905).
495 N. J. Eq. 35, 122 Atl. 378 (1923) aff'd., 96 N. J. Eq. 385, 124 AtM
760 (1924).
*Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638 (1913); Sutton v.
Warren, 10 Met. 451 (Mass., 1845) ; Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367, 71
Am. Dec. 555 (1858) ; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99
, TRATISE
N. E. 845, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355 (1912) ; JOSEPH H. Bir
ON THE CONFU T OF LAws (1935), Sec. 115.1.
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